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Summary
Using  microdata from a field survey of children in rural
Andhra Pradesh, India, we estimate econometric models which
aim to identify the key explanatory factors in the school versus
out-of-school dichotomy.  The approach differs from that of
many other previous studies of child schooling, by focusing on
the effects of sibling competition within the household.  The
value of this approach is confirmed by our findings that the
schooling decision depends as much on the child’s
characteristics and position within the household, as on the
circumstances of the household taken as a unit.
1.  Introduction
The issue of child labour versus schooling
1 has received growing attention in recent
years.  However, the mention of child labour tends to invoke an image of children
toiling in factories to produce export goods under poor working conditions, and
poverty is often considered to be its major cause.  Until now, this stereotypical view
has tended to govern investigations of the issue.  Early historical studies focused on
the experience of developed countries, where the incidence of child factory workers
surged in the wake of industrialisation and then decreased virtually to zero
2
(Nardinelli, 1990; Weiner, 1991).  In similar vein, a large number of case studies have
been devoted to children in manufacturing industries with ‘hazardous’ and
‘exploitative’ occupations such as carpet-weaving and football-stitching (Burra, 1995;
Anker et al.,1998; Mishra, 2000).  The truth of the matter is that child factory workers
are a small minority, and 84% of the estimated total of 11.3 million child workers in
India are engaged in agriculture and related sectors
3.
A second respect in which the stereotypical view of child labour has guided research
is the claim that poverty is the major cause.  This claim is based largely on the
empirical facts that the incidence of child labour tends to be higher in low-income
countries, and higher among low-income households within a country.  The main
misapprehensions arising from these facts are the inferences that all poor children
work, and that all working children are from poor households.  These inferences are
                                                       
1 According to the 1991 Census of India (Government of India, 1991), 41% of children aged between
five and fourteen in Andhra Pradesh are ‘in-between’, i.e. neither work (as wage workers) nor attend
school.  In our data set, only 4% of out-of-school children fall into this category and the rest are
engaged in either paid work, family work (e.g. cultivation) or domestic work.  We define child workers
as all out-of-school children, and use the terminology ‘schooling versus work’..
2 It should be noted that child labour still exists in some industrialised countries.  For example,
McKechnie and Hobbs (1998) report on children of Mexican migrants working on US farms.
3 The 1991 Census of India (Government of India, 1991).  The agricultural sectors referred to here
include the categories of the Census: ‘cultivators’, ‘agricultural labourers’ and ‘livestock, forestry,
fishing, hunting and plantations, orchards and allied activities’.2
false, as is clearly evident in  our and in other studies
4.  Some of the poorest
households are observed sending at least some of their children to school, while some
better-off households are observed sending children to work.
Such misperceptions prevail partly because earlier studies have used the household or
region as the unit of analysis (Rosenzweig, 1982; Hossain, 1990), masking the within-
household differences highlighted in the last paragraph.  This approach has often been
necessary because household survey data sets are being analysed whose original
purposes are unrelated to child schooling, and which contain little or no information
on individual children within the household.  Our data collection was, in contrast,
administered with the objective of collecting all relevant information on each
individual child. The importance of shifting the focus from household to child is
evident in the data: 58% of the sampled households contain a mixture of children who
work and children who go to school.
The obvious way to proceed is to follow the approach of Bhalotra and Heady (1998)
and  Grootaert (1998), by treating each child in the sample as an individual decision
making unit, in order to allow for and explain within-household differences in
schooling choices.  The process leading to a schooling decision for an individual child
is clearly complicated, with demographic, social and cultural, as well as economic
factors entering the decision-making process.  Taking into consideration all of these
types of factor simultaneously, it is desirable to explain firstly why some children go
to school while others do not, and secondly what process operates within the
household for deciding which of the children will go to school.  We therefore use
binary data analysis to investigate exactly how demographic factors such as age,
gender and birth order enter the schooling decision, while controlling for household
characteristics and community circumstances.
Section 2 contains a literature review of models of the schooling-work decision.
Section 3 presents a model of the schooling decision.  Section 4 describes the data and
the econometric modelling strategy, and then reports and interprets the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2.  Existing models of the schooling-work decision
From the previous literature on the determinants of child labour and schooling, three
broad approaches may be identified.  Each has advantages and disadvantages.  This
section examines each in turn, thus providing motivation for the approach taken in
this paper.
2.1 Fertility decision models
An early fertility decision model, and a point of departure in analysing the
determinants of child labour, is the ‘quantity-quality’ model of Becker and Lewis
(1973).  This model is built on the assumption that high fertility in developing
                                                       
4 Lieten (2000) quotes an interview with a father in a northern Indian village, saying “we are poor, but
not so poor that we cannot send our children to school.”  See also Bhatty (1998) and the PROBE Team
(1999) for field-based evidence, as well as Ray (1999; 2000a; 2000b) and Psacharopoulos (1997) for
quantitative evidence, that poverty is not the major determinant of child labour.3
countries results from the high perceived economic value of children, and is used to
investigate what triggers a transition in parents’ preference - from quantity to quality -
of children.  The models in this class examine a household’s joint decision on: how
many children it has; how children’s time is allocated to wage work, family work and
schooling; and how resources are distributed among household members.
A substantial amount of empirical work has followed this theoretical contribution (for
example, Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977; Levy, 1985; Kanbargi, 1991).  The wide
diversity of research aims, data sets and variable definitions make it hard to draw
general conclusions from this body of literature.  However, some common results
emerging are that: a rise in parents’ educational levels has a strong negative effect on
fertility and a strong positive effect on schooling; child labour-force participation is
positively related to the child’s wage; household income (usually proxied by adult
wage), although not being the decisive factor, appears to have a positive effect on
schooling.  Other variables representing wealth, such as  land-holding, have
ambiguous effects, showing positive effects in some studies and negative in others.
Fertility decision models have the virtues of simplicity and convenience, and can
identify which types of household are more likely to choose to educate their children.
They are also particularly relevant to the case of the schooling-work choice in rural
areas, which is of interest here.  However, their assumptions of unitary utility of the
household and unitary decisions have been challenged theoretically and empirically.
Their problem is that, since they treat the children of a household in aggregate,
summarising their educational status with, for example, ‘enrolment indices’
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1982), they have no power to predict the extent to which all
children in a household will be equally educated.
2.2  Labour supply models
The standard model of labour supply in neoclassical economics amounts to a utility
maximising choice of consumption-leisure combination.  Dynamic extensions to this
model, namely human capital investment models (see for example Alderman and
Gertler, 1997, and Jafarey and Lahiri, 1999), consider the choice between work and
education, and incorporate the trade-off between current income and the higher future
income that is the return from education.  In such models, time is often divided into
two periods: in the first, parents either invest in childrens’ schooling or send them to
work; in the second, parents rely on their children’s earnings for their own welfare.
Parents make choices in order to maximise their lifetime utility which depends on
consumption in the first and second periods, subject to  intertemporal budget
constraints.  These choices are usually modelled in the framework of a dynamic
optimisation problem.
Such dynamic models are useful in explaining differences in schooling by gender (see
Pscharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985; Strauss and Tomes, 1995; Alderman and Gertler,
1997).
Although there is some evidence in the literature that rates of return to female
education is higher than to males’, we have reasons for expecting the opposite to be4
true
5.  Firstly, female earnings are generally lower than male earnings.  Secondly,
daughters in patrilineal societies do not contribute economically to their natal families
after marriage to the same extent as sons do.  Thirdly, a higher educational level
attained by a girl tends to lead to a higher amount of dowry incurred by parents
6.  It is
for these reasons that parents are less willing to educate girls than boys in rural India.
Most labour supply models and human capital models have emerged in the context of
industrialised countries, and it must be borne in mind that the assumptions underlying
them do not always apply in the context of the child schooling decision in developing
countries.  First, such models assume a smoothly functioning credit market, which is
not likely to exist in a context such as rural India
7.  Second, the models are often
concerned with the decision to enter further or higher education, not the decision to
enter primary school which is of interest here
8.  Third, the models are built on the
assumption that choices are made by the individual.  In our context, the schooling
decision is more likely to be made by adult members of the household
9 (normally
parents).
In view of this last point, any model of the schooling decision should incorporate
parents’ preferences
10.  Some past studies have achieved this by combining
characteristics of the children with those of their parents (Grootaert, 1998; Ray, 1999,
2000a, 2000b; Kambhampati and Pal, 2000).  Bhalotra and Heady (1998) go a step
further by allowing an inter-generational flow of wealth and human capital
accumulation through education and work experiences, in order to take account of the
dynamic nature of household decision making
11.
2.3  Demographic models
Demographic models examine the relationship between the demographic
characteristics of a child (e.g. number of siblings, birth order) and their educational
attainment (as measured by test scores, completed years of schooling, or earnings).
These studies are of limited relevance here because they use  ex-post data on
adolescents or adults, usually in developed countries.  The concept of ‘zero-
                                                       
5 Tilak (1987:100) finds that the rate of return to female education turns out to be negative when it is
adjusted for non-participation in the labour force.
6 Brides are normally matched with grooms whose educational levels are equal to or higher than theirs.
Since grooms with higher educational level are likely to have better-paid jobs, they tend to command
higher amounts of dowry.  Parents, who find it hard to raise money for dowry, are reluctant to educate
girls.
7 Tilak (1987:144) states that the credit market in India is “too poorly organised to provide any funds to
the people for investing in education.”
8  Kooreman and  Wunderink (1996:181) state that most human capital investment models restrict
attention to the decisions made by individuals who have completed elementary education.  See also
Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993:88-93) for further criticism of human capital theory
9 In household interviews, almost all parents and children said that  the decision on enrolment to
primary school was made by parents.  However, see Iversen (2000) for an interesting discussion of
‘autonomy’ in child labour migrants.
10 See Becker and Tomes (1976), Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) and Behrman (1988a; 1988b)
for household behaviour on intra-household resource allocation (e.g. altruistic, inequality aversion, and
reinforcing the difference).
11 There are also some  studies which examine inter-generational effects concerning children’s
schooling by gender (i.e. father-son or mother-daughter nexus).  See Drèze and Kingdon (1998), Ray
(1999), Kambhampati and Pal (2000).5
attainment’ (i.e. non-enrolment), which is of interest here, is not normally an issue in
these models.  Nevertheless, the studies provide some very useful insights.
A demographic model which is widely used is the ‘confluence model’ of Zajonc et al.
(1979), in which two theories are tested.  The first is ‘resource dilution’ which
predicts that the more children there are in the household, the lower the educational
quality, since the resources of the household, in terms of both material resources and
parents’ attention, are diluted.  The second theory is the ‘teaching effect’ which
predicts that the presence of siblings has a positive influence on educational
achievement, through the benefit of either teaching younger siblings, or being taught
by older siblings.  Empirical studies tend to support the ‘resource dilution’ theory
when the number of children in the household is the explanatory factor.  However,
studies which have analysed the effects of birth order have generated mixed results on
both theories (Steelman and Mercy, 1980; Behrman and Taubman, 1986; Kessher,
1991; Travis and Kohli, 1995).
It is easy to see why results relating to birth order are not consistent.  Firstly, early-
born children may, by the resource dilution effect, enjoy advantages through
experiencing less competition for resources in their early years than do their younger
siblings, and, by the teaching effect, benefit from having younger siblings to teach.
However, later-born children may be better-positioned, because household income
normally increases from an early to a late stage of marriage union
12 and they have
many teachers (i.e. their elder siblings).  We might therefore expect mid-borns
(second-borns, third-borns, ..., but not last-borns) to face the fiercest competition for
resources, but to benefit most from the teaching effect.  ‘Only-children’ are of special
interest because they have an advantage in terms of resources, but are doubly
disadvantaged in terms of the ‘teaching effect’.
The nature of competition among siblings also depends to an extent on the sib-
structure, particularly sibling gender.  Morduch (2000) reports that the number of
sisters a child has, has a positive impact on schooling.  Similarly, Kessher (1991)
finds that females in female-siblings-only households are less disadvantaged than
females in mixed-sex-siblings households.  On the other hand, Butcher and Case
(1994) propose that females with brothers receive more education than females with
only sisters.  Parish and Willis
13 (1993) assert that competitive pressure is higher
between same-sex siblings.
So we see that birth order can affect the educational attainment of a child in a number
of different ways, including complicated interaction effects with sex and sibling
composition, resulting in ambiguous predictions.  This provides clear motivation for
our own detailed investigation of the effect of birth order in a multiple regression
context.
3. The Model
                                                       
12 Although this applies to salaried workers whose incomes increase with tenure, it may not apply to
waged labourers.
13 They also present an interesting finding that the effect of birth order on the schooling-work decision
is observed among low-income households but it decreases among middle- to higher-income
households.  They, however, argue that resource constraints (i.e. poverty) are one determinant, and
credit constraints and socio-cultural contexts are others.6
A number of important points have emerged from the literature review of the previous
section.  Firstly, the child, rather than the household, is the appropriate unit of
analysis.  Secondly, the constraints faced by a child do not correspond closely to those
assumed in traditional labour supply models, such as budget and credit constraints,
but, rather, take the form of resource constraints within the household, resulting from
the interactions with other household members - siblings, parents, grandparents and so
on.  Thirdly, in the decision between schooling and work, many different factors are
relevant, which may be grouped into three sets of variables: characteristics of the
child, the household and the community in which the child lives.
These considerations lead us to a model of the following form (see Binder, 1998).
Note that since the data set used in the study is a single cross-section, the model is
static.  We specify:
Sijk = S (Iijk , Hjk , Ck) [1]
where Sijk represents the schooling-work decision pertaining to child i in household j
in community k; Iijk are a set of variables representing the child’s characteristics and
position in the household
14; Hjk contains the characteristics and circumstances of the
household; and Ck represents features of the community.  In accordance with the
objectives of the paper, emphasis is placed on demographic variables contained in I
and H, controlling for the effects of other relevant variables contained in H and C.  In
practice, features of the community such as labour market conditions and pupil-




The data was collected between August and November 1999, from 101 households in
six villages, spread between four districts of rural Andhra Pradesh, India.  The six
villages are: Uyyalawada, Dhobipet, Dandu, Amdapur, Palapadu and Rajbolaram.  At
least one district was selected from each of the three regions of Andhra Pradesh, in
order to ensure high variation in levels of development and agro-climatic conditions.
Furthermore, the six villages were selected to maximise the variation in socio-
economic and agricultural development, and the households within each village were
selected to maximise variation in household type (e.g. with respect to children’s
status, income and caste).  Of the 101 households surveyed, 18 have only school-
going children, 24 have only working children, and the remaining 59 have a mixture
of school-going and working children.  The 101 households contain a total of 267
children aged between five and fourteen
15, of which 119 are boys and 148 are girls.
                                                       
14 Variable set I might be expected to include factors representing a child’s innate ability, such as health
condition.  However, such variables are not included in this study due to non-availability of data.
15 To focus, as we do, on the five to fourteen age-group is consistent with the Constitution of India
which stipulates that employment of children below the age of fourteen years in hazardous occupations
is prohibited, and seeks to provide free, compulsory, education for all children up to the age of
fourteen.7
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1a and 1b present summary information on the incidence of school-going
children.  Table 1a reveals the following: girls, in general, appear less likely to go to
school than boys; first-borns are less likely to go to school than later-borns regardless
of sex; and finally, the likelihood of going to school appears to rise monotonically as
birth order increases.  Table 1b focuses on second-born children, and reveals that their
likelihood of schooling is dramatically higher if their older sibling is a girl.  However,
it is unwise to attempt to draw too many conclusions from such crude analysis.  Due
to the fact that the opportunity cost of education rises with age, older children are,
ceteris paribus, less likely to be attending school than younger children, which may
be the reason why birth order appears to have the effect just noted.  Son-preference
does not appear to apply for first-borns, but it may do for boys as a whole.  All of
these considerations underline the need for an econometric model in which all of the
effects are considered simultaneously.
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We have estimated various binary Logit models of school attendance, using data on
subsets of the 267 children from the 101 households in the sample (due to missing
values, the sample size varies according to the model estimated).  The dependent
variable is  one if the child goes to school, and  zero otherwise.  An interesting
possibility would be to consider the schooling and work decisions as separate, and to
estimate a bivariate model for the two decisions simultaneously.  Such a model is
tenable because, as noted in footnote 1, some children neither work nor attend school,
and, indeed, some children do both.  However, the benefits of such an approach are
limited because the numbers of such children are so small
16.  Hence the univariate
approach is pursued here.
It has been suggested (Binder, 1998) that when the child is used as the unit of
analysis, observations should be weighted inversely to the number of children in the
household.  We have avoided this strategy, because it suggests that less importance
should be attached to children from larger households.  All children are equally
important, whether they come from large households or small households, and hence
we do not weight observations in estimation.
Tables 2a and 2b present the results from six models.  Before interpreting their
coefficients, we shall outline the model selection procedure which led to the final
specification, Model 5.
4.4 Model Selection
The main purpose of models 1 through 4 is to try out different combinations of
variables, using  Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
17 to guide model selection.
The advantages of using AIC for this purpose are that it adjusts the goodness-of-fit to
allow for the number of parameters in the model, and that it is especially suited to the
comparison of non-nested models.  AIC has been used intensively in model selection
in a cross-section econometric context by Lyons et al. (2001).
The first set of variables listed relates to the child’s characteristics: these are included
in all models because of their clear significance.  The second set of variables listed
relates to the child’s position in the household, and, since it is here that the focus of
the paper lies, it is these variables on which most of the experimentation is performed.
It is found that the best specification, and therefore the one used in the final model, is
one in which the number of siblings is divided into various categories.
A large number of other variables are tested for significance in different
combinations.  Those that show significance are included in the final model.
                                                       
16 When a bivariate probit model is estimated, the correlation coefficient between the two equations’
error terms is estimated as -0.979; this strong negative correlation is consistent with the very low
numbers of children in both or neither activity.
17 Akaike’s Information Criterion is defined as AIC = (-2LogL + 2k)/n, where LogL is the maximised
log-likelihood, k is the number of parameters in the model, and  n is the sample size.  The most
preferred model is the one with the smallest AIC.9
4.5  Interpretation of coefficients
Age and gender
It appears at first sight, from the negative coefficient of the gender dummy, that male
children are less likely to go to school than females.  However, this is not the case: we
also  need  to consider the coefficient of the interaction variable, male·age.  The
positive coefficient of this interaction variable implies that the negative effect of age
is greater for girls than for boys (in the final model, the slope is –0.42 for girls and –
0.14 for boys).
18  A consequence is that the logit (and therefore the probability of
going to school) is lower for girls than for boys over most of the relevant age range.
In fact, as shown in Figure 1, girls have a lower schooling probability at every age
over 8.25 years (this is worked out as the ratio of two coefficients 2.303/0.279)
19.
Moreover, the difference between boys’ and girls’ probabilities of schooling increases
as age rises
20.  This result reaffirms the disadvantaged situation of girls’ schooling as
well as revealing the dynamic nature of children’s status.
Figure 1: Propensity to schooling by sex
Birth order
One of the major challenges of this paper was how to introduce birth order.  Past
studies were of little use, since the few that had adopted this variable did so in a
simplistic way.  For example, Kambhampati and Pal (2000) simply code it as 1, 2, 3,
… from the eldest, while  Bhuiya &  Streatfield (1992) and Binder (1998) create
dummy variables in a somewhat arbitrary manner.  As mentioned in Section 4.4,
several different specifications were investigated here.  Models 1 and 2
straightforwardly include the child’s birth order in the same manner as Kambhampati
and Pal (2000), and find that this variable has a significantly positive effect on the
                                                       
18 A quadratic term in age was included during the specification search, but was found not to be
significant.
19 The enrolment ratio is generally lower for girls than boys in India.  The fact that in figure 1 the
converse appears to apply to very young children may be because the sample is not representative of
the total child population of Andhra Pradesh.  The essential point here is that girls are more likely to
drop out as they grow older.
20 The causes of high drop-out rates for girls are socio-cultural, in addition to the economic causes
listed in section 2.2.  Two examples are early marriage and parents’ reluctance to allow girls to travel









21.  In the discussion of the descriptive statistics in table 1a of
section 4.2, the point was made that the birth-order effect noted there may be simply a
consequence of the fact that older children, who tend to have a lower birth order, are
less likely to attend school.  However, in models 1 and 2, we have found that the
birth-order effect is a pure effect, and applies even if the age of the child is held
constant.
A different strategy is adopted in model 3, which instead uses a set of dummies
indicating the child’s precise position within the household.  Here, it is found that
first-borns are significantly less likely to be educated than other children.  Perhaps
surprisingly in the patriarchal context of rural India, this first-born disadvantage
appears to apply to both genders equally
22.
Models 1-3 are out-performed by a specification in which the number of siblings is
divided into various categories (models 4 and 5).  Model 5 is the final model
23 which
finds in particular that the number of elder working sisters has a significantly positive
effect on schooling
24, while the number of younger brothers attending school has a
significantly negative effect.
25
These results are consistent with resource dilution theory (see section 2.3), but in a
very particular way.  There is no doubt that the resource constraint is binding, but it
appears to be the eldest sister in the household who bears the burden.  In the case of
landless households (which make up 63% of the sample) subsistence depends upon
daily wages, so additional workers in the household have the potential to generate a
considerable easing of the household’s budget constraint.  Thus it is seen why the
presence of elder working sisters has the observed positive impact on schooling.  The
negative effect on a child’s schooling of the presence of school-going younger
brothers appears to constitute evidence of son preference
26.
                                                       
21 One question we considered was whether it was appropriate for the last-born in a large household to
be assigned a higher ‘score’ than the last-born in a small household, as is necessarily the case if birth
order itself is used.  Using the log of birth order instead is a way of reducing any distortion arising from
this.  This was tried but did not improve the model according to the AIC.
22 The conclusion that the first-born disadvantage applies to both genders equally was drawn from an
unreported model in which an interaction term combining the first-born dummy with gender was
introduced and found not to be significant.
23 Before reaching the final model, a dummy variable distinguishing single-sex from mixed-sex sib-
constellations was included, since previous studies have found (see section 2.3) that girls with only
sisters may be advantaged relative to girls with brothers and sisters.  However, this dummy did not
show significance, and the effect of sibling composition is captured better by the categorisation of
siblings introduced in model 5.
24 The negative and significant coefficient on the square of the number of elder working sisters may be
interpreted as ‘diminishing returns to elder working sisters’ and perhaps implies that the presence of
such siblings is more important than the number thereof.
25 It should be said that by dividing up child’s position in the household in this very detailed way, we
are leaving ourselves open to the problem of endogeneity.  The decision to send a sibling to work must,
logically, depend to an extent on the schooling decision made for the child under analysis.  This, of
course, implies that variables like “number of working elder sisters” may be endogenous.  The strength
of the effects we see in model 5 may be partly explained by this problem.  However, to deal with the
problem of endogeneity in this context would require estimation of simultaneous equation binary data
models, which are certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
26 See Pearson (1998) who reports that daughters work to finance sons’ education.11
Other demographic variables
Model 1 finds that the household size has a non-linear (inverted-U) effect on
schooling, with an implied ‘optimal’ size of six.  Models 2 and 3 find a similar effect
of the number of school-aged children in the household; the ‘optimum’ here appears
to be around 3.5.  When the number of school-aged children in the household is
greater than 3.5, the negative effect of this variable on schooling is consistent with the
resource dilution theory.  However, it must be said that these results are slightly
misleading.  The fact that the ‘optimal’ number of school aged children is around 3.5
is a simple consequence of the fact that if a child is a member of this ‘optimal’
household, he or she is more likely to have an older working sister than if there were
only two, say, school aged children.  Our rigorous model selection process has
revealed that the number of siblings per se is not what is important.  Sibling gender
and working status are crucially important, and this is precisely the reason why model
5, which makes this distinction, is found to be superior to all the others estimated.
With regard to household structure, the presence of infants is thought to have a
negative effect on schooling, particularly for girls, due to the need to care for them in
households with working parents.  If grandparents are present in the household as well
as infants, the negative effect of the presence of infants is thought to be lower.
However, neither of these household traits was found to have an effect.
Socio-economic status
Variables such as income
28, land-holding, parents’ educational level and caste, which
past studies have identified as important, are found to be insignificant in this data set.
However, the variables asset index
29, the number of rooms in the house, and a dummy
variable for agricultural/waged labour, which also qualify as measures of the
economic status of household, show that children of better-off households are more
likely to go to school.
Mother’s age, rather than parents’ educational level which is not significant, appears
to be acting as a proxy for the effect of parents’ perceived value of education.  Its
strongly significant negative coefficient shows that the older the mother, the less
likely the child is to attend school,  ceteris paribus.  In 83% of the sampled
households, both parents are illiterate, and it is reasonable to infer that they have no
experience in schooling.  However, as people’s contacts with the world outside their
village develop, through for example development of transportation and media, they
are likely to become more aware of the benefits of education.  Younger mothers are
probably more exposed in this way than older mothers, and therefore to be more
inclined to educate children.
                                                       
27 See Table A.1 in Appendix for the definition of Asset Index.
28 We have adopted the variable, income group, instead of the actual amount of income, due to the
problem of measurement error with income data, particularly for agrarian households (Shariff, 1999).
The sample households are divided into five income groups, taking account of income, land-holding,
livestock and other assets.
29 See Table A.1 in Appendix for the definition of Asset Index.12
Religion (Christian)
The positive coefficient associated with the Christian dummy indicates that Christians
are more likely to educate their children, ceteris paribus.  It is known that Christians
are keen to educate children (both boys and girls), which is often cited as one of the
reasons that the Indian state of  Kerala has attained high literacy (Ramachandran,
1997).  It appears that the same Christianity effect is at work in our study villages.
Village dummy
The only village showing a significant difference from the others is Dhobipet, where
the probability of schooling appears to be higher than that in the other five villages.
This can be explained by the fact that a local NGO is operating in Dhobipet with the
objective of withdrawing children from work and enrolling them in school, by means
of motivating parents and children towards education, but, tellingly, without
providing economic assistance.  As the model shows, their activities appear to have a
positive impact on children’s schooling.
Models 6a, 6b and 6c
Since we have identified sibling status as a key determinant of the schooling-work
decision, it is desirable to examine these effects more closely by isolating the
households which contain a mixture of working and school-going children.  Since
competition between siblings is clearly taking place in these households, potentially
more precise results relating to such competition may be obtained by restricting the
sample in this way.  To allow fully for gender differences, we have estimated the
model separately for boys and girls.  Table 2b includes the results of models 6a (for
boys), 6b (for girls) and 6c (for all).
Model 6c certainly provides focused results: children, at any age, are more likely to
go to school if they have working elder sisters, and are less likely to go to school if
any of their siblings go to school.  By comparing models 6a and 6b, we can see
whether these effects differ by gender.  We see that there is one striking difference:
for girls, the presence of younger sisters at school has a significantly negative effect
on schooling; for boys, their presence has no effect.  This close examination of sibling
structure reveals that girls are not only disadvantaged by the presence of brothers, but
also face competition from sisters, especially younger sisters.13
Table 2a: The results of 5 simple Logit models
Dependent variable: 1 - if child goes to school; 0 - otherwise.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant -2.864 (3.395) 2.488 (1.944) 2.151 (2.216) 5.783 (1.551)*** 5.988 (1.479)***
Child’s characteristics
Male -3.314 (1.480)** -2.514 (1.270)** -2.771 (1.277)** -2.989 (1.346)** -2.303 (1.340)*
Age -0.566 (0.119)*** -0.451 (0.098)*** -0.428 (0.104)*** -0.455 (0.112)*** -0.418 (0.104)***
Male·age 0.418 (0.145)*** 0.318 (0.125)** 0.354 (0.127)*** 0.361 (0.133)*** 0.279 (0.132)**
Child’s position in household
Birth order 0.358 (0.170)** 0.289 (0.135)**
# working elder brothers 0.228 (0.257)
# elder brothers at school 0.002 (0.404)
# working elder sisters 1.955 (0.577)*** 2.310 (0.621)***
# working elder sisters squared -0.510 (0.282)* -0.725 (0.309)**
# elder sisters at school 0.609 (0.387)
# younger brothers at school -0.561 (0.338)* -0.868 (0.337)**




Only child 0.019 (1.156)
Household characteristics
Household size 1.943 (0.862)**
Household size squared -0.150 (0.064)**
No of children aged 5-14 1.789 (0.890)** 2.065 (0.954)**
No of children aged 5-14 squared -0.267 (0.144)* -0.283 (0.147)*
Presence of infants -0.257 (0.536)
Presence of infants and elderly 0.118 (0.842)
Income group 0.340 (0.234)
Asset index 0.182 (0.101)*
Land-holding 0.038 (0.528)
Ownership of livestock -0.562 (0.436)
Agricultural and wage labour -0.687 (0.349)**
No of rooms 0.413 (0.179)** 0.427 (0.178)** 0.421 (0.196)** 0.416 (0.203)**
Fathers’ educational level -0.012 (0.120)
Mother’s educational level -0.264 (0.207)
Age of mother -0.084 (0.033)** -0.076 (0.031)** -0.102 (0.035)*** -0.104 (0.034)***
Caste
Scheduled caste 0.625 (0.972)
Scheduled tribe 2.134 (1.243)*





Christian 1.066 (0.847) 0.949 (0.507)*
Village
Uyyalawada (base)





Sample size (n) 230 252 252 252 252
LogL -112.3023 -132.561 -130.2289 -122.143 -119.9126
Number of parameters (k) 24 10 12 14 13
AIC [ ” (-2LogL + 2k)/n] 1.1852 1.1314 1.1288 1.0805 1.0549
Source: Field survey
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
  *** indicates significance at 1% level.
**   indicates significance at 5% level.
*     indicates significance at 10% level.14
Table 2b: Different effects on boys and girls, restricting sample to “mixed” households
Model 6a (boys) Model  6b (girls) Model 6c (all)
Constant 9.954 (4.940)** 7.354 (2.848)** 8.706 (2.348)
Child’s characteristics
Male -3.468(2.072)*




# working elder brothers 1.268 (1.103) -0.349 (0.581) 0.021 (0.395)
# elder brothers at school -5.285 (1.625)*** -2.026 (1.071)* -3.407 (0.811)***
# working elder sisters 1.924 (0.895)** 1.148 (0.554)** 1.407 (0.422)***
# elder sisters at school -1.982 (1.073)* -0.733 (0.806) -0.924 (0.569)
# younger brothers at school -4.850 (1.373)*** -2.591 (0.871)*** -3.402 (0.684)***
# younger sisters at school 0.654 (1.228) -1.584 (0.678)** -1.240 (0.541)**
Household characteristics
Asset index -0.090 (0.424) 0.043 (0.166) 0.038 (0.153)
Agricultural and wage labour -0.016 (0.880) -0.229 (0.759) -0.493 (0.518)
No of rooms 1.214 (0.934) 0.463 (0.416) 0.521 (0.339)
Age of mother -0.187 (0.125) -0.081 (0.073) -0.081 (0.053)
Christian 2.741 (1.117)** 0.466 (1.415) 1.873 (0.775)**
Village
Dhobipet 2.370 (1.696) 0.945 (1.168) 1.468 (0.826)*
Sample size (n) 83 88 171
LogL - 22.610 - 32.702 - 60.189
Number of parameters (k) 14 14 16
AIC [ ” (-2LogL + 2k)/n] 0.8821 1.0614 0.8910
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
  *** indicates significance at 1% level.
**   indicates significance at 5% level.
*     indicates significance at 10% level.
5. Conclusion
Previous studies of the determinants of child labour and schooling have been biased
towards factory workers and the effects of household characteristics such as the level
of household income.  They tend to overlook the majority of child workers in rural
areas and to lack consideration to competition among siblings within a household with
respect to the opportunity for education.  It was these two perceived shortcomings of
the existing literature that motivated this research.
The fieldwork provided useful insights in the development of the empirical models
used.  In one household interview, a father with three school-age children explained
his own decision: “… one for wage work, one for domestic work and one for
schooling, because I am unable to sustain life if all of my children attend school.”
30 In
another interview, parents explained that “all girls worked for the son”
31, meaning that
girls were working in order to finance their brother’s education.  Examples such as
these make it clear that a thorough study of child labour must delve into the intra-
household decision-making process, in addition to taking due account of the
characteristics of the household and community.
                                                       
30 Field Survey (30/9/1999).
31 Field survey (7/11/1999).15
Of the child’s characteristics, age and sex are the most important determinants of the
work-schooling decision.  In addition, we have hypothesised that the child’s position
within the household is relevant, and is the key to capturing sibling rivalry.  A number
of our results are in agreement with previous studies, for example, the evidence that
boys are more likely to attend school than girls, and drop-out rates are higher among
girls.  However, we do not find evidence of the prevailing view that eldest sons are
given priority to education.  Instead, we have found evidence that key factors in the
schooling decision are the presence of working elder sisters and school-going younger
brothers, and that boys compete within the same sex (i.e. with their brothers) while
girls face double competition: first with brothers and then with sisters.  Older sisters
appear to be the most disadvantaged.
Two theories which emerged as important in the literature survey of section 2.3 were
the resource dilution theory and the teaching effect.  A number of our results favour
resource dilution theory.  It has been harder to find evidence in favour of the teaching
effect, as it was in previous studies cited in section 2.3.
Household economic  status (represented by asset level, housing conditions and
occupational type), have a modest influence on children’s schooling.  The negative
effect of mother’s age has been interpreted as indicating that awareness of the
importance of education plays a role.  This is also shown by the significant positive
premium on schooling probability exhibited by the village of Dhobipet, which has
been attributed to the  NGO’s activities aimed at increasing interest in children’s
education in that village.
The clear policy implication of this work is that the difference in schooling status of
children within the same household should be borne in mind.  Simply targeting lower-
income households would not be sufficient to achieve universal elementary education.
While such targeting may alter the mix of school-going and working children within
the targeted households, there is no guarantee that every disadvantaged child will
benefit.  What is clearly vital is to pay attention to each individual child who is
disadvantaged in schooling.
Although the findings summarised here must be considered within the specific
context of the survey villages, it is hoped that they will be useful in guiding future
lines of research on the determinants of children’s work and schooling, and perhaps
also in policy formation.16
Appendix
Table A.1: Definition of variables
Name of variable Definition
Male 1: boy, 0: girl
Age Age of a child
Male·age Interaction term of male and age
Birth order Birth order of a child: 1, 2, 3… from the eldest
# working elder brothers No of working elder brothers
# elder brothers at school No of elder brothers at school
# working elder sisters No of working elder sisters
# working elder sisters squared No of working elder sisters squared
# elder sisters at school No of elder sisters at school
# younger brothers at school No of younger brothers at school
# younger sisters at school No of younger sisters at school
First-born 1: first-born child, 0: otherwise
Mid-born (base) 1: mid-born child, 0: otherwise
Last-born 1: last-born child, 0: otherwise
Only child 1: only-child, 0: otherwise
Household size No of household members
Household size squared Square of no of household members
No of children aged 5-14 No of children aged between 5 and 14
No of children aged 5-14 squared Square of no of children aged between 5 and 14
Presence of infants 1: if infant(s) is present, 0: otherwise
Presence of infants and elderly 1: if infant(s) and elderly are present, 0: otherwise
Income group Quintile income groups (5: the wealthiest, …, 1: the poorest)
Asset index Sum of points given to assets (TV:4, radio:1, casette:1, bike:1,
fun:1, camera:1)
Land-holding 1: if a household owns land, 0: otherwise
Ownership of livestock 1: if a household owns livestock, 0: otherwise
Agricultural and wage labour 1: if a household’s main occupation is agricultural labour or wage
labour, 0: otherwise
No of rooms No of rooms in which a child lives
Fathers’ educational level Father’s completed years of schooling
Mother’s educational level Mother’s completed years of schooling
Age of mother Age of mother
Scheduled caste 1: if a household belongs to scheduled caste, 0: otherwise
Scheduled tribe 1: if a household belongs to scheduled tribe, 0: otherwise
Backward caste 1: if a household belongs to backward castes, 0: otherwise
Other castes (base) 1: if a household belongs to other castes, 0: otherwise
Hindu (base) 1: if a household’s religion is Hindu, 0: otherwise
Muslim 1: if a household’s religion is Muslim, 0: otherwise
Christian 1: if a household’s religion is Christianity, 0: otherwise
Uyyalawada (base) 1: if a child lives in Uyyalawada, 0: otherwise
Dhobipet 1: if a child lives in Dhobipet, 0: otherwise
Dandu 1: if a child lives in Dandu, 0: otherwise
Amdapur 1: if a child lives in Amdapur, 0: otherwise
Palapadu 1: if a child lives in Palapadu, 0: otherwise
Rajbolaram 1: if a child lives in Rajbolaram, 0: otherwise17
Table A.2: Means and standard deviations of variables used for regression analyses
No of observation Mean SD
Male 267 0.45 0.50
Age 267 9.84 2.67
Male·age 267 4.32 5.16
Birth order 267 2.92 1.47
# working elder brothers 267 0.43 0.70
# elder brothers at school 267 0.23 0.47
# working elder sisters 267 0.50 0.66
# working elder sisters squared 267 0.69 1.27
# elder sisters at school 267 0.26 0.55
# younger brothers at school 267 0.36 0.55
# younger sisters at school 267 0.39 0.65
First-born 267 0.15 0.35
Mid-born (base) 267 0.52 0.50
Last-born 267 0.31 0.46
Only child 267 0.03 0.16
Household size 267 6.45 2.06
Household size squared 267 45.78 34.12
No of children aged 5-14 267 3.06 0.94
No of children aged 5-14 squared 267 10.22 5.72
Presence of infants 267 0.21 0.41
Presence of infants and elderly 267 0.08 0.27
Income group 267 3.00 1.16
Asset index 267 1.07 1.80
Land-holding 267 0.49 0.50
Ownership of livestock 267 0.57 0.50
Agricultural and wage labour 267 0.39 0.49
No of rooms 254 1.89 0.97
Fathers’ educational level 232 0.48 1.47
Mother’s educational level 265 0.17 1.04
Age of mother 265 33.24 5.69
Scheduled caste 267 0.42 0.49
Scheduled tribe 267 0.17 0.38
Backward caste 267 0.32 0.47
Other castes 267 0.05 0.22
Hindu 267 0.82 0.38
Muslim 267 0.04 0.20
Christian 267 0.13 0.34
Uyyalawada 267 0.21 0.41
Dhobipet 267 0.17 0.38
Dandu 267 0.19 0.39
Amdapur 267 0.09 0.28
Palapadu 267 0.13 0.34
Rajbolaram 267 0.21 0.41
Source: Field survey18
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